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I. Introduction and Motivation 
This paper investigates the determinants and structure of managerial pay of the leaders of 
American labor unions. There has been considerable research into the determinants of executive 
compensation in for-profit companies the United States (e.g. Murphy, 1985; Murphy 1999; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). However, considerably less attention has been placed on 
compensation (and managerial compensation in particular) in nonprofit organizations. Only 
recently have authors begun to investigate the compensation of managers in nonprofits (e.g. 
Oster, 1998; Hallock, 2002) and even made some comparisons between managerial pay in for-
profit and nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2004). 
Studying managerial compensation in nonprofit organizations is particularly difficult since 
the goals and objectives of these organizations are less clear than they are in the for-profit sector. 
While many argue that for-profit companies are organized principally to create returns for 
shareholders, the objectives of nonprofits may differ quite dramatically. One issue that comes 
out of previous research on compensation in nonprofits is the need to focus attention on 
particular industries within the nonprofit sector since the objectives of nonprofits may 
dramatically differ across industries (e.g. Ehrenberg, Cheslock and Epifantseva, 2002 who study 
universities or Bertrand, Hallock and Arnould, 2005 who study hospitals). Nursing homes is an 
example where a potentially important objective could be considered (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 
1986). Perhaps one would want to compensate a manager of a nursing home based on 
“trustworthiness”, but this is incredibly difficult to measure. Other measures of performance in 
nonprofits include increased public awareness, cost savings, increased funding (Rocco, 1991), 
and customer satisfaction (Bailey & Risher, 1996). It is clear from these examples that 
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identifying and measuring appropriate measures for the goals and objectives of nonprofits is 
complicated. 
The work reported in this paper is an attempt to carefully and credibly consider how the 
leaders of labor unions are paid in the United States. Labor unions are particularly interesting 
because they represent a case where the objectives of the manager and the organization are, 
perhaps, better defined (and measurable) than in other nonprofit sectors. Clearly, unions are 
interested in both the level of employment and the level of wages of their members (French, 
Hayashi, & Gray, 1983). As described below, we collect data on each and empirically determine 
their relative importance in a managerial compensation empirical specification. This may be a 
way to consider an implicit objective function for the manager. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss some previous 
literature on compensation of managers in nonprofits and in unions in particular. In section III, 
we explore the collection and organization of the data. Section IV reports the main empirical 
results and Section V offers some concluding comments. We find that there is wide 
heterogeneity in how labor unions compensate their managers. Further, the effect of union’s 
membership is a large and significantly related to the compensation of the union’s Presidents, 
with elasticities on the same order of magnitude as the elasticity of compensation to firm market 
value for publicly traded firms. Similarly, the average wage of the rank and file union member is 
related to the pay of union presidents. In the end, both union membership and wages of 
members are importantly related to the pay of union Presidents. 
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II. Previous Work, Econometric Specification, and Issues 
Previous work has shown that one of the strongest correlates of managerial pay in American 
nonprofits (Hallock, 2002) and for-profit organizations (Lambert, Larker, & Weigelt, 1991; 
Murphy, 1985) is the size of the organization. Size is believed to have such a high correlation 
with manager’s pay because managers in larger organizations have responsibility for more 
resources and more people. Although managers of nonprofits are paid considerably less than 
those in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2002; Preston, 1989), a great deal of this is explained by the 
size of the organization (measured for example by total assets). However, for organizations of 
similar size, it has been found that non-equity-based compensation is not particularly different in 
nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2004)1. In addition, Hansmann (1980, 
1996) and others outline that nonprofit organizations are not barred from making “profits”, but 
they are barred from distributing the excess funds to those in control of the organization. 
However, it is possible to compensate managers of nonprofits with incentive-based pay 
(Steinberg, 1990a, 1990b). “One way to minimize the probability that executives will take 
actions contrary to the organization’s goals is to tie their compensation to measures of their 
organization’s performance” (Ehrenberg & Goldberg, 1977, p. 188). We investigate a variety of 
issues that have been hallmarks in the study of compensation of managers in for-profit firms 
including the elasticity of pay to firm size (Rosen, 1992) and the relationship between 
organization performance and managerial pay (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2000). As noted above, examining unions provides a unique view on the 
importance of organization performance, measured as wages of members and membership 
levels, to the compensation of the top union official. 
1
 At the same time, equity compensation in for-profit firms is often an important fraction of total compensation. 
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A small set of previous studies have investigated the links between the compensation of 
union Presidents and certain union characteristics. Each of the studies uses only cross sectional 
data. We briefly mention six of them here. Bressler (1972) examined the compensation of 97 
local union presidents in the construction industry in 1967 by regressing annual compensation of 
the top official on membership size, total net worth of membership, and the hourly wage rate of 
workers. He found that all were significantly associated with compensation at the 0.01 
confidence level, and concludes that “union officials are not unaffected by the agreements they 
negotiate” (pg. 49). Ehrenberg and Goldberg (1977) investigated the performance and 
compensation of the 670 heads of building trade unions in 1971. They found that the salary of a 
local business agent of a union is related to the “ability to pay” (defined as total dues and total 
assets) and to his own bargaining performance (measured by absolute level of wages and relative 
wages compared to wages in and outside their craft). Sandver (1978) examined 100 large local 
unions using data from 1962, 1967 and 1973. He found, among other results, that membership 
was significantly related to the compensation of the head of the unions he examined. Sandver 
and Heneman (1980) studied the relationship among the top three highest paid officials in the 
100 largest national unions in 1962, 1967 and 1973. Among their findings is that there is a stable 
relationship (over time) between the pay of the top person and the second two, similar to that 
found in for-profit companies. French, Hayashi and Gray (1983), using data from 1978, showed 
a relationship between union head’s compensation and measures of union financial strength, job 
complexity (measured with the variables: number of locals, functional specialization of 
administration, industrial diversity of membership, and geographical dispersion of membership), 
and tenure in the job. Finally, French (1992) investigated the relationship between power and 
pay of 136 international unions in 1977 and 108 international unions in 1987. French defined 
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power in his analysis by the procedures and structures used by unions to elect its officers. More 
autocratic structures (indicated by longer presidential terms of office, longer intervals between 
conventions, the election of presidents at conventions, and the election of the board on an at-
large basis) were argued to create more power for union presidents. French found support for the 
hypothesis that power and pay were positively related. 
As previously noted, none of the previous studies on the compensation of union Presidents 
made use of panel data. On the other hand, we investigate a panel of eight years, from 2000 
through 2007. Therefore, one of the issues from all previous studies, that of unmeasured 
heterogeneity of the organizations themselves, can be addressed in our work. Further, we can 
investigate the extent to which this is a problem. 
Our main empirical specification considers the determinants of compensation of the 
President of the union as follows: 
lnPit = p\nMit + ylaWit + 6\nAit + ai + eit (1) 
where P is the total compensation of the President of the labor union, M is total membership in 
the labor union, W is the average wage of union members2 (defined below), A is the total assets 
of the labor unions, i indexes unions, t indexes time, and ( ai + eit) is the composite error term 
containing possible permanent effects. No doubt, average total compensation of the members 
(including pensions, benefits etc.) would be a better measure than W. However, we do not have 
access to such data and assume that pensions and benefits are highly correlated with the wage in 
these organizations. 
Clearly, however, the set of organization characteristics does not fully explain the 
relationship between compensation and membership and member wages (see the R2 values in the 
2
 A more complicated specification may replace the average wage of union members with the union wage relative to 
the non-union wage. We do not explore that in this paper. 
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OLS specifications below), and therefore, in some specifications, we have chosen to allow for 
the possibility that other characteristics of the Presidents and the unions which have not been 
included thus far in previous research are confounding our investigation of the link among these 
key variables. 
To help remedy this problem, we make use of the benefits of the panel data. We can 
assume that the source of the endogeneity arises only through the permanent component of the 
error term, α i , and not through the transitory component, εit , then the standard fixed-effects 
estimation of equation (1) will yield consistent estimates of the parameters. 
III. Data 
The data for this paper come from LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 reports filed by each labor 
organization from 2000 – 2007 (inclusive)3 that is subject to the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), and the Foreign Service 
Act (FSA). The forms disclose a common set of information for all labor unions. Individual 
data include information such as liabilities, loans, mortgages, dividends, rents, gifts and grants, 
investments, members of the unions, total dues paid and compensation of the president. We 
focus on only a sub-set of the information in the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 forms. In all, we study 
75,717 organization-years of data for 15,942 unique organizations. 
We also categorize labor unions as “International”, “Intermediate” or “Local” based on 
the United States Department of Labor Office of Labor-Management Standards. Much of the 
analysis below will be done separately for each of these three categories of labor unions. 
3
 LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 data are actually available back to 1959 (the date of the passage of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act) on microfilm. We are in beginning stages of collecting data from years prior to 2000. 
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We begin by considering summary statistics for only international unions in Table 1a. It 
is clear from the table that the average (nominal) union president compensation over time in 
these data is $141,859, with a median of $112,235. Figure 1 shows that this average increased 
considerably over time (from $111,211 in 2000 to $213,391 in 2007). The average international 
union had 108,848 members. The median number of members is much smaller (11,642) due to 
the fact that some of the international unions are so large. The average level of assets for the 
international unions over this time is $36.4 million and the total annual dues is $17.3 million. 
We also created an estimate of the average union member wage, 
W = (D/0.015)/M, (2) 
Where D = total annual dues of the union, M is the total unions membership, and we assume that 
1.5% of the union member’s pay is contributed to the labor union as dues.4 Using the formula in 
equation (2), we computed that the average member of an international labor union during this 
time earned $42,111. Table 1b and 1c report summary statistics for intermediate and local labor 
unions, respectively. There are clearly substantially more intermediate union-years of data in our 
intermediate sample (3,934) than international (362). There are still more local (71,397). The 
tables clearly show that local unions pay their presidents substantially less than and are smaller 
than (in terms of assets and membership) intermediate unions, which are substantially smaller 
than international unions. However, the estimate for the average wage of intermediate union 
members is substantially higher than the average member wage of locals and internationals. This 
is due to this number being an estimate, and comes from the fact that there are small numbers of 
members in the intermediate unions. 
4
 See Rasian (1983) for further discussion of the appropriateness of the assumption that union members during this 
period paid, on average, between 1.13% and 1.6% of their wages in union dues. 
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IV. Empirical Results 
As is clear from equation (1) we are interested in testing whether membership and average 
wage of members are two primary goals of labor unions. If the union wants to align the interests 
of its leader with that of its membership, then it seems reasonable that these two measures would 
be related to the pay of the head of the union. In addition, we include a measure of firm size 
(total assets) as this represents a firm’s ability to increase membership and wages. 
To begin, consider Figure 2, which plots the natural logarithm of the President salary against 
the natural logarithm of the membership, by year. Visually, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the two. This is true whether we examine internationals (Figure 2a), 
intermediates (Figure 2b), or locals (Figure 2c). Another measure of organization scale or 
success could be assets. Figure 3 (organized similar to Figure 2) plots the relationship between 
the natural logarithm of pay of the union Presidents against the natural logarithm of the assets in 
his or her organization for international unions (Figure 3a), in intermediate unions (Figure 3b), 
and local unions (Figure 3c). Figure 4 plots the natural logarithm of the unions President’s pay 
against the estimated average unions member wage as we computed in equation (2). It is clear 
from Figure 4 that the relationship between the President pay and the estimated average wage of 
the members is less positive than the relationship between union President pay and union 
membership or between union President pay and union assets. 
Table 2 displays results from specifications like that of equation (1) for only international 
unions. In column (1) we regress the natural log of President compensation on the natural log of 
membership and estimate a large and significant elasticity of 0.338. Column (2) repeats this 
exercise using the natural log of the estimated average union member wage as the independent 
variable. The estimated coefficient is much smaller (0.106) but also statistically significantly 
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different from zero. In column (3) we do the analysis again only controlling for the natural log 
of assets. The estimated elasticity is 0.394 and statistically significantly different from zero. 
Columns (4) – (7) investigate various combinations of these covariates and include year effects 
(in column 7). Column (7) suggests that all three independent variables (ln(membership), 
ln(estimated average wage) and ln(assets) are significantly related to the compensation of the 
union President. The R2 = 0.623 suggests that quite a large fraction of the variation in the pay of 
the union head is explained by variation in the independent variations, and quite a bit more than 
in a typical study of for-profit CEO compensation (Murphy, 1999). 
A virtue of our data, however, is that we have multiple observations (up to eight each) on the 
compensation of the President and union characteristics for each union in sample. Column (8) of 
Table 2 uses this information and controls for organization fixed-effects in the specification of 
international union president compensation. This produces some interesting results. Even 
controlling for organization fixed-effects, there is a positive relationship between international 
President wages and membership and president wages and estimated average worker wages, and 
both are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
Table 3 repeats the analysis of Table 2 but investigates the compensation of leaders of 
intermediate unions, rather than international unions. Again, membership, estimated average 
worker wage and assets are all unconditionally related to the pay of the head of the intermediate 
union. However, when we control for individual organization fixed effects (in column 8), the 
relationship between President pay and membership is positive and significant (estimated 
elasticity of 0.166) and the relationship between President pay and estimated average worker pay 
is positive and significant (estimated elasticity of 0.180). These two elasticities are both 
significantly different from zero and are statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
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Table 4 repeats the analysis for the local unions – the group for which we have 
overwhelmingly more data. Throughout the table, the estimated coefficients are larger than they 
are in each of the previous tables. When we look within organizations in column (8) of Table 4, 
we see that the elasticity of President compensation with respect to membership is 0.361 and the 
elasticity of President pay with respect to the estimated worker wage is 0.282. Both of these 
elasticities are significantly different from zero. 
In summary, there seems to be a large and positive relationship between the 
compensation of the heads of American labor unions and the number of members they have in 
their union and the estimated average wage of those members. Both variables matter. 
V. Concluding Comments 
A significant body of literature exists on the compensation of managers of firms in the 
United States (Murphy, 1999), with more recent research conducted on the compensation of 
managers in nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2002). However, only a small number of studies 
have investigated the determinants of pay of top union officials; none examining these 
determinants longitudinally. We hope this is a useful first step in the empirical investigation of 
the compensation of the presidents of American labor unions over time. 
The argument for the link between executive pay and organizational performance is clear: 
because executives are in change of the success of the organization, part of their pay should be 
contingent on how well the organizations does (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Similar to for-profit 
firms, it appears that the pay of union Presidents is tied to the performance of the organization he 
or she leads. We find that the pay level of top union officials is strongly correlated with the 
number of members within the union and the estimated wage for those members. Further, we 
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find these results in all three types of unions (international, intermediate, and local), and find 
these variables are significant when controlling for firm size (with the variable total assets), and 
even when controlling for organization (with organization fixed effects). It appears that within 
unions, as number of members and average member pay increases, the top union official’s pay 
also increases. The results of our analysis are aligned with past studies conducted with cross 
sectional data on the compensation of local union officers (Bressler, 1972; Ehrenberg & 
Goldberg, 1977; Sandver, 1978), and national union officers (French et al., 1983; French, 1992; 
Sandver & Heneman, 1980). 
The emergence of paid full-time union officials continues to be the subject of considerable 
debate (French, 1992). Some analysts have argued that this development in labor unions ensures 
that the rewards of union leaders are tied to the membership’s goals (French, 1992; Kochan, 
1980). Bok and Dunlap (1970) assert that replacing voluntary leaders with salaried officers has 
enhanced the effectiveness of collective bargaining and therefore advanced the interests of union 
members. These authors state: “Union members have doubtless suffered far more from 
inefficient and unimaginative administration than they have ever lost through corruption and 
undemocratic processes” (pg. 90). Whereas others, suggested in the quote above, have argued 
that the transition to full-time paid leadership may reduce the responsiveness of officials to 
interests of union members and has led to a decline in democratic practices within unions 
(French et al., 1983; Lipset, 1970). These analysts believe that the compensation of union 
officials is related to their control over the rank-and-file (e.g. French, 1992). The results of our 
study shed some light on this debate. Our findings suggest that the pay of the union President is 
significantly related to at least some measures of the performance of the union. In particular, 
size of membership and average wage of members, are both positive and significantly related to 
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the compensation of the union President. Therefore, it appears the “administrative 
rationalization”, defined as “the making of union decisions through rules, organization and 
expertness rather than through trial by struggle, ideology and hit-or-miss” (Barbash, 1969, p. 
147), may have led to the betterment of the rank-and-file. 
Although the results of this study provide strong evidence that the compensation of union 
Presidents is linked to performance of the union, the findings and interpretations from this study 
must remain tentative. For example, a number of other factors important to the rank-and-file, 
such as benefits of members, relative wage of members, number of strikes, number of layoffs, 
etc., might influence the salaries of union presidents and have not been included in the present 
study. 
Very little is known regarding the pay of union presidents. We hope the findings from this 
study enhance what we know about compensation in nonprofits and motivate further research in 
this area. 
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Figure 1. Average Pay of Presidents of International Labor Unions. 
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Figure 2c. 
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Table 1a. International. Summary Statistics 
President 
Compensation 
Members 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
N 
All Years 
141859 
(137816) 
[112235] 
108848 
(361274) 
[11642] 
42111 
(154831) 
[14270] 
36400 
(81800) 
[4294] 
17300 
(45100) 
[2180] 
362 
2000 
111211 
(89529) 
[100629] 
118496 
(370923) 
[8130] 
36318 
(143783) 
[12395] 
32600 
(70000) 
[2405] 
16200 
(42800) 
[1761] 
53 
2001 
124185 
(106675) 
[106300] 
118439 
(382702) 
[11894] 
39636 
(159392) 
[12747] 
33700 
(71500) 
[3856] 
17300 
(45900) 
[2191] 
55 
2002 
130152 
(111803) 
[109657] 
110712 
(1358391) 
[11540] 
39430 
(142516) 
[14168] 
33500 
(71500) 
[5238] 
17500 
(44700) 
[2545] 
62 
2003 
140557 
(118382) 
[117611] 
63771 
(127843) 
[11750] 
38075 
(131220) 
[15448] 
32400 
(73100) 
[3960] 
13100 
(30600) 
[2583] 
66 
2004 
145211 
(126779) 
[114572] 
99380 
(347853) 
[10782] 
36687 
(122368) 
[15255] 
35500 
(78900) 
[4216] 
17000 
(44600) 
[2386] 
66 
2005 
183822 
(151521) 
[131629] 
183745 
(595487) 
[23205] 
24045 
(34302) 
[15696] 
45400 
(107000) 
[10300] 
26200 
(68900) 
[4162] 
21 
2006 
198270 
(268800) 
[122927] 
134966 
(496932) 
[13847] 
94631 
(297679) 
[18277] 
39000 
(96500) 
[5022] 
19500 
(56800) 
[1799] 
32 
2007 
213391 
(161828) 
[175592] 
114119 
(205867) 
[18519] 
32472 
(25097) 
[19160] 
118000 
(206000) 
[49300] 
31300 
(48800) 
[10400] 
7 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Median in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M = (total annual union dues / 0.015) / total union membership 
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Table 1b. Intermediate. Summary Statistics 
President 
Compensation 
Members 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
N 
All Years 
64270 
(175730) 
[55485] 
6987 
(27366) 
[1894] 
153966 
(1200376) 
[11702] 
2021 
(7723) 
[130] 
1408 
(5119) 
[179] 
3934 
2000 
49512 
(43033) 
[47851] 
6140 
(22026) 
[1873] 
159832 
(1564272) 
[10345] 
1285 
(3981) 
[105] 
941 
(2850) 
[162] 
540 
2001 
58140 
(130421) 
[54477] 
5988 
(19470) 
[1905] 
158378 
(1340950) 
[11991] 
1476 
(4399) 
[139] 
1064 
(3109) 
[183] 
629 
2002 
68777 
(187233) 
[56767] 
7521 
(28725) 
[2012] 
126585 
(877089) 
[11629] 
1843 
(6667) 
[147] 
1363 
(4656) 
[186] 
656 
2003 
76092 
(319119) 
[56601] 
7482 
(29472) 
[1950] 
148768 
(990140) 
[11146] 
2065 
(7989) 
[136] 
1424 
(5062) 
[185] 
673 
2004 
62791 
(57551) 
[60648] 
7710 
(31627) 
[1912] 
172960 
(1366815) 
[11958] 
2215 
(8456) 
[149] 
1581 
(5693) 
[204] 
661 
2005 
66240 
(166461) 
[42164] 
6917 
(33043) 
[1489] 
96264 
(560751) 
[13132] 
2742 
(10600) 
[98] 
1764 
(6659) 
[145] 
253 
2006 
71056 
(145642) 
[53076] 
7426 
(30397) 
[1726] 
195416 
(1293656) 
[13778] 
3076 
(11100) 
[113] 
2024 
(7650) 
[164] 
407 
2007 
52363 
(52363) 
[49915] 
4934 
(8853) 
[1712] 
159988 
(733777) 
[12059] 
2783 
(11500) 
[165] 
1682 
(6250) 
[198] 
115 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Median in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 1c. Local. Summary Statistics 
President 
Compensation 
Members 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
N 
All Years 
26837 
(51552) 
[6052] 
865 
(4054) 
[235] 
35226 
(316499) 
[21465] 
558 
(3106) 
[62] 
379 
(1670) 
[75] 
71397 
2000 
22688 
(36801) 
[5298] 
799 
(3106) 
[235] 
29216 
(82143) 
[19567] 
415 
(2017) 
[52] 
310 
(1209) 
[70] 
10847 
2001 
25530 
(42121) 
[5999] 
912 
(4337) 
[241] 
30228 
(57159) 
[20637] 
509 
(2398) 
[61] 
371 
(1583) 
[76] 
11782 
2002 
27283 
(44649) 
[6528] 
928 
(4481) 
[243] 
33568 
(199482) 
[21513] 
569 
(2994) 
[66] 
392 
(1601) 
[78] 
12210 
2003 
28466 
(51853) 
[6591] 
907 
(4026) 
[241] 
37578 
(401473) 
[22271] 
579 
(2770) 
[67] 
407 
(1731) 
[79] 
12273 
2004 
29161 
(50176) 
[6674] 
940 
(4458) 
[242] 
39085 
(397678) 
[22713] 
628 
(3304) 
[67] 
441 
(2043) 
[81] 
11937 
2005 
22116 
(68370) 
[4800] 
600 
(4738) 
[182] 
42854 
(609844) 
[21037] 
518 
(3848) 
[50] 
275 
(2047) 
[58] 
4386 
2006 
29697 
(62114) 
[6217] 
745 
(2834) 
[230] 
38280 
(322593) 
[22830] 
629 
(3675) 
[70] 
369 
(1338) 
[76] 
6612 
2007 
33511 
(122509) 
[8829] 
837 
(3176) 
[254] 
46891 
(522586) 
[23607] 
982 
(8092) 
[98] 
449 
(1996) 
[84] 
1350 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Median in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 2. International. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
Ln(membership) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
Ln(assets) 
Year effects 
Org effects 
Constant 
Adj. R2 
N 
(1) 
0.338*** 
(0.023) 
no 
no 
8.160*** 
(0.222) 
0.371 
362 
(2) 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
no 
no 
10.328*** 
(0.325) 
0.023 
362 
(3) 
0.394*** 
(0.017) 
no 
no 
5.372*** 
(0.256) 
0.605 
362 
(4) 
0.017 
(0.029) 
0.382*** 
(0.026) 
no 
no 
5.393*** 
(0.259) 
0.604 
362 
(5) 
0.081*** 
(0.021) 
0.391*** 
(0.016) 
no 
no 
4.665*** 
(0.313) 
0.619 
362 
(6) 
0.099*** 
(0.033) 
0.121*** 
(0.025) 
0.320*** 
(0.028) 
no 
no 
4.449*** 
(0.317) 
0.628 
362 
(7) 
0.100*** 
(0.033) 
0.123*** 
(0.025) 
0.320*** 
(0.029) 
yes 
no 
4.477*** 
(0.366) 
0.623 
362 
(8) 
0.204** 
(0.095) 
0.068** 
(0.028) 
- 0.045 
(0.046) 
yes 
yes 
9.613*** 
(1.107) 
0.954 
362 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p-value < .10 
** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
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Table 3. Intermediate. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
Ln(membership) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
Ln(assets) 
Year effects 
Org effects 
Constant 
Adj. R2 
N 
(1) 
0.285*** 
(0.012) 
no 
no 
8.150*** 
(0.088) 
0.130 
3934 
(2) 
0.308*** 
(0.012) 
no 
no 
7.392*** 
(0.110) 
0.150 
3934 
(3) 
0.440*** 
(0.008) 
no 
no 
4.935*** 
(0.102) 
0.416 
3934 
(4) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.434*** 
(0.010) 
no 
no 
4.911*** 
(0.104) 
0.416 
3934 
(5) 
0.183*** 
(0.010) 
0.398*** 
(0.008) 
no 
no 
3.772*** 
(0.115) 
0.464 
3934 
(6) 
0.479*** 
(0.016) 
0.518*** 
(0.014) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
no 
no 
0.853*** 
(0.144) 
0.562 
3934 
(7) 
0.478*** 
(0.016) 
0.517*** 
(0.014) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
yes 
no 
0.683*** 
(0.173) 
0.562 
3934 
(8) 
0.166*** 
(0.024) 
0.180*** 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
yes 
yes 
7.556*** 
(0.347) 
0.930 
3934 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p-value < .10 
** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
33 
Table 4. Local. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
Ln(membership) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
Ln(assets) 
Year effects 
Org effects 
Constant 
Adj. R2 
N 
(1) 
0.897*** 
(0.003) 
no 
no 
3.989*** 
(0.019) 
0.520 
71397 
(2) 
0.647*** 
(0.007) 
no 
no 
2.543*** 
(0.072) 
0.101 
71397 
(3) 
0.633*** 
(0.002) 
no 
no 
1.889*** 
(0.026) 
0.514 
71397 
(4) 
0.523*** 
(0.004) 
0.356*** 
(0.003) 
no 
no 
2.080*** 
(0.024) 
0.592 
71397 
(5) 
0.347*** 
(0.005) 
0.600*** 
(0.002) 
no 
no 
-1.214*** 
(0.054) 
0.542 
71397 
(6) 
0.686*** 
(0.004) 
0.584*** 
(0.005) 
0.215*** 
(0.003) 
no 
no 
-3.079*** 
(0.047) 
0.663 
71397 
(7) 
0.688*** 
(0.004) 
0.583*** 
(0.005) 
0.213*** 
(0.003) 
yes 
no 
-3.018*** 
(0.055) 
0.664 
71397 
(8) 
0.361*** 
(0.007) 
0.282*** 
(0.006) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
yes 
yes 
4.599*** 
(0.085) 
0.942 
71397 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p-value < .10 
** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
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